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record against his testimony. Texas courts must now accept the fact that the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in the truth seeking process outweighs
the limited interests of the State in protecting its witnesses who have charges
pending against them.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has established some objective
standards for the courts to use in the exercise of their discretion on limitation
of cross-examination for bias impeachment. Evans represents the proposition
that indictments, complaints, or informations will no longer be automatically
excluded from evidence for impeachment of witnesses not a party to the
prosecution. The Evans decision, when coupled with the right under article
38.29 to impeach an accomplice witness for bias with pending charges, 55 will
furnish Texas with a "complete" approach to bias impeachment. In the
future, when there is a principal witness furnishing vital and relevant testimony against the accused, any pending charges against that witness may be
introduced to show any taint of bias or motive on the part of the witness to
falsify his testimony.
Jess C. Rickman

LIBEL-Constitutional Privilege-Scheme to Defame
Political Candidate Coupled With Unreasonable
Headlines Is Evidence of Actual Malice
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.,

211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975).
Two weeks before the West Virginia gubernatorial election of 1968, the
Charleston Daily Mail, owned by defendant Clay Communication, Inc.,
published a series of articles concerning certain real estate transactions of
James M. Sprouse, the Democratic Party candidate. His opponent's campaign staff had released the information and had participated in an investigation with the newspaper. The oversized headlines referred to the real estate
transactions as a "land grab," "bonanza," and "cleanup," implying a clandestine character through the use of "dummy firm" and "disclosed." The text
of the articles, however, did not support these representations. In a suit for
libel, Sprouse alleged that the articles were defamatory and was awarded
$250,000 actual and $500,000 punitive damages by the jury. Held55. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.29 (1966).
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Affirmed.' Once a scheme to defame a political candidate for office is
established, an unreasonable deviation between the headlines and the text
of the publication is in and of itself evidence of actual malice, which can
support a jury verdict for libel.
Social conflict between the individual interests of reputation and freedom
of the press began centuries ago. The invention of the printing press
produced political libel.2 Libel and the media were governed by the common
law standard of "fair comment."'3 Opinion and comment were protected, but
proof of malice, in the sense of personal spite or ill will, defeated this qualified privilege. 4 These conflicting interests have always existed in this country, yet there has also been a strong national commitment to the fundamental
freedom of press.5 Originally, the first amendment freedoms restrained only
actions of the Federal Government, but in 1925 they became applicable to
the States through incorporation by the fourteenth amendment. 6 In 1964
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan7 made the constitutional privilege of free
press a reality by limiting the power of the states to determine whether a
public official has been libelled." In New York Times, the Supreme Court
held that the law precludes recovery by public officials unless they prove that
the statement was made with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."9 The
fundamental constitutional principle underlying the "actual malice" rule is
free political expression,' 0 which includes severe criticism of public officials"
and the protection of erroneous statements.' 2 Apprehensive of any law
which might discourage criticism of the government,' 3 the Supreme Court
created this strict standard requiring "convincing clarity"'14 to safeguard the
1. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Fayette County as to the actual damages but reversed and remanded
with instructions to strike the jury award of punitive damages. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 698 (W. Va. 1975).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 111, at 738 (4th ed. 1971);
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546,
561 (1903).
3. W. PROSSER,HANDBOOK OF Tim LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See generally 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §§ 100, 132, 134 (1948).
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-76 (1964).
6. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-71 (1925).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Id. New York Times arose from the minority view in the state courts that criticism and comment should extend to any false statements of fact if honestly believed
to be true. Three-fourths of the states held that the qualified privilege of "fair comment" was limited to opinion and comment only. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 118, at 819-20 (4th ed. 1971).
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
10. Id. at 269-71.
11. Id. at 270.
12. Id. at 271.
13. Id. at 276-79.
14. Id. at 285-86; see Comment, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official,
80 IARv. L. Rlv. 1730, 1733-34 (1967).
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freedoms of speech and press. 15 The "actual malice" standard has been ex17
panded to include political candidates1 6 and public figures.
Later Supreme Court decisions have defined "actual malice" as that which
requires a "high degree of awareness of probable falsity,"' 8 or "serious doubts
as to the truth."'

9

The rule, however, does not pertain to unreasonability,

negligence or even gross negligence. 20 "Actual malice" focuses on the truth
or falsity of the published material, entirely different from the common law
standard of "malice" which concerned a defendant's attitude. 21 It is well
established that intent to injure, hostility or ill motive, all of which evidence
"malice," are constitutionally insufficient to show "actual malice."'22 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that allowing the jury to consider personal
ill will as relevant is incorrect notwithstanding proper instructions on actual
malice. 23 There is, accordingly, a significant distinction between intent to
injure and intent to injure through falsehood. 24 Evidence of a hostile or
adverse attitude evinces intent to injure, as opposed to evidence of knowledge
of a falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth which indicates intent to
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
16. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). The Supreme Court stated
that it was illogical that publications regarding candidates for public office be accorded
any less protection than those concerning occupants. Id. at 271.
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
18. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); accord, St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
19. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Actual malice may be
shown by proof that the story was fabricated by the publisher, that the source of information was unreliable or the information inherently improbable, which the publisher
knew or recklessly disregarded, or that the publisher recklessly disregarded the availability of information to disprove the falsity. Id. at 731-33.
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964); accord, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964). In an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan which
expressed the views of six Justices, three concurring, it was stated that: "The test which
we laid down in New York Times is not keyed to ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere negligence, but on reckless disregard for the truth."
Id. at 79.
21. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, -

U.S.

-, -,

95 S. Ct. 465, 470, 42 L. Ed.

2d 419, 426-27 (1974).
22. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) the Court reversed a West Virginia decision where the instructions stated that the plaintiff could recover if it were found that the defendant published editorials with ill motives and intent
to injure. Accord, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964), where the Court
found that any definition of actual malice which included "ill will, evil motive, intention
to injure . ..is constitutionally insufficient in discussion of political affairs." In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966), it was held improper to base recovery on mere
intent to injure.
23. Rose v. Koch, 154 N.W.2d 409, 421-22 (Minn. 1967). In Washington Post Co.
v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967), the
court stated that juries are not allowed to infer malice from the face of a publication
or a defendant's hostility.
24. In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) the distinction was made where
the Court held that the instructions were improper because they could have been under-
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injure through falsehood. Intent to injure shows malice, whereas intent to
25
injure through falsehood proves actual malice.
In Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.,26 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that once a scheme to injure has been established,
an unreasonable deviation between the headlines and the text of a newspaper
is evidence of actual malice. It is a case of first impression; an attempt to
create a basis for proving actual malice. 27 Though the court admitted that,
by itself, an unreasonable deviation would be insufficient to support "actual
malice," it allows a jury to infer "actual malice" from the face of the publica28
tion, once a conspiracy to defame through publication has been shown.
The rule is structured on the proposition that the defendant newspaper, the
Daily Mail, was no longer acting in the capacity of a fact-finding, impartial
29
reporter of news, but rather as a participant in a conspiracy to defame.
The newspaper's source of information was the plaintiff's political opponent,
whose campaign staff, aided the newspaper's investigation of the real estate
transactions and assisted in disseminating the article to other newspapers.
This was evidence of the newspaper's departure from its role as an independent news-gatherer, and of its intent to injure by exposing the political
candidate Sprouse.
The American system is one of adversity and participation.30 The court's
premise that New York Times and its progeny regard newspapers as
stood to allow recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to

inflict harm through falsehood.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1970).

Accord, Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v.

25. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965); accord, Greenbelt Cooperative

Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1970).

26. 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975). It will be assumed for the purposes of
this analysis that the evidence supports the findings of the court-that the Daily Mail

had abandoned its role as an impartial reporter of facts, that there was a scheme to
injure and that the deviation between the headlines and the supporting article was unreasonable.
27. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), expresses the
difficulty in proving actual malice:

The obvious purpose of these cases is to create a rule of law more restrictive for

public official plaintiffs than the pre-Times practice of allowing juries to infer

malice from the face of defamatory publications. (Citation omitted.) Malice, under
the pre-Times practice, was equated with hostility, vindictiveness or negligent disregard of reputation. Under the Times test, false statements made with these motives alone are not actionable; maliciousness may be shown only through knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.
Id. at 967; see Comment, Defamation of the Public Official, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 614,
634 (1966).

28. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 682-83 (W. Va. 1975).
29. Id. at 682-83.
30. Judge Learned Hand stated:
The First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all."
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"independent, news-gathering agencies" is unsound.31 The idea of an
involved, biased and opinionated press permeates the whole of New York
Times.3 2 It adheres to the proposition that "'[p]ublic men, are, as it were,
public property,' and 'discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as
the duty, of criticism must not be stifled.'
The law of New York Times
lives in the atmosphere of an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" press, 34
",33

not "confine[d] . . . to reporting the facts

.

. in temperate terms . . ."

as Sprouse intimates.3 5 These acts of partisanship and adversity by a newspaper reveal an intent to injure; irrelevant in the determination of "actual
malice." Politically valuable knowledge, essential to the democratic system,
cannot be ignored simply because the opposition proffered the information
36
and aided the investigation.
The court in Sprouse treats the departure from objective reporting as tantamount to a conspiracy to defame. 37 Acts of partisanship indicate intent to
injure whereas evidence of a scheme or conspiracy to defame evinces intent
to injure through falsehood, pertinent in the determination of knowledge of
the falsity or reckless and willful disregard of the truth.38 This integration
of partisan reporting and conspiracy to defame exists primarily because the
sufficiency of the scheme is wholly dependent upon the evidence of the departure from independent, neutral reporting. 39 The scheme to defame deNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). The Court further stated:
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
31. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 687 (W. Va. 1975).
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-76 (1964).
33. Id. at 268, quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263-64 n.18 (1952).
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
35. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 689 (W. Va. 1975).
36. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966). In circumstances similar to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a staff reporter was assigned
to cover the racial violence in Alabama in 1960; the resulting article referred to the local
police commissioner. The source of the libelous statements were negro ministers and
biased participants in the racial conflict, and the court ruled that these biased sources
certainly did not constitute reckless and willful disregard for the truth. The court
stated:
While verification of the facts remains an important reporting standard, a reporter, without a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity may rely on
statements made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the
story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official.
Id. at 576; accord, Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 680-81, 691-92 (W. Va.
1975).
38. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965); accord, Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1970).
39. This departure from independent neutral reporting is apparent,
[Firom the evidence that not only did the Mail work closely with the Moore campaign staff to discover the details of the land transaction, but also that it fully cooperated in disseminating the articles to other newspapers for publication through-
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pends entirely upon the evidence that the Daily Mail acquired the information from a political opponent whose campaign staff assisted the investigation and dissemination of the news release. But material information derived
from the political opponent does not necessarily amount to conspiracy. Even
if this evidence were construed as supporting a scheme to defame, the rule
would nevertheless fail constitutionally because it is couched in language admonishing adverse involvement by the press. 40 Failure to distinguish between "malice" and "actual malice," and their respective evidentiary character of intent to injure and intent to injure through falsehood has been the
precise problem in several Supreme Court cases. In those cases "actual
malice" was not found because it was impossible to determine whether the
jury inferred "actual malice" from intent to injure rather than knowledge or
reckless and willful disregard. 41 Sprouse fails to recognize the distinction between evidence evincing intent to injure and evidence of intent to inflict harm
through falsehood, just as it fails to distinguish partisan reporting from a
scheme to defame.
To support the relevancy of departure from objective reporting in the determination of actual malice, Sprouse relies heavily on Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts. 42 In that case a public figure was libelled by a national magazine
which had adopted a new policy of scandalous "muckraking" to increase circulation. The magazine employed very poor investigatory techniques and knew
of their source's questionable integrity. The fact situation in Curtis is an excellent illustration of the guidelines later announced in St. Amant v. Thompson, 43 that "actual malice" may be shown by evidence that the publisher
fabricated the story, recklessly disregarded the availability of information to
disprove its falsity or knew that the source of information was unreliable.
Obviously, Curtis presented circumstances which evinced intent to injure
through falsehood, pertinent to the issue of "actual malice," but it is illogical
to hypothesize that departure from independent news-reporting is evidence
of actual malice. In Curtis, the departure from objective reporting was extensive-evidence of intent to inflict harm through falsehood. Whereas in
out the State.

Under those circumstances the difference between the fair implica-

tion of the headlines as opposed to the supporting factual recitation of the stories

is evidence alone of malice, which absent evidence to the contrary, supports the
jury verdict.
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 691-92 (W. Va. 1975).
40. Id. at 680-81, 691-92.

41. In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) a
member of the State House of Delegates was inferentially libelled by a newspaper in
a neighboring town during real estate negotiations with the city council. The jury was
instructed and found libel on the basis of general hostility toward the plaintiff combined
with the falsehood. The Supreme Court stated that the judgment was constitutionally
erroneous because it was impossible to determine "whether the jury imposed liability on
a permissible or an impermissible ground." Id. at 11; accord, Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S.
356, 357 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).
42.

388 U.S. 130 (1967).

43. 390 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1968).
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Sprouse, there is merely zealous, partisan news-reporting-evidence of intent
to injure.
Although the "actual malice" standard was extended to include public
figures by the majority in Curtis,44 the constitutional rationale applicable to
political figures is different from the social interests apposite to public
figures. The distinction is manifest in Curtis by the personal motive of publishing defamatory material about public figures for monetary gain compared
to the motive of printing possible libel concerning political figures for political objectives. Personal objectives versus political ones; they are wholly different societal interests. 45 That constitutional rationale specifically
applicable to the political environment, firmly supports the standard of
"actual malice." Protection of seditious libel 46 cannot be mitigated by social
47
policy apropos to private citizens who are the subject of public interest.
The Sprouse rule that a scheme to injure, coupled with unreasonable, exaggerated headlines is relevant evidence of "actual malice,"' 48 is defeatingly
analogous to the combination of hostility and falsity denounced by the
Supreme Court as imposing liability on an "impermissible ground.1 49 In
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,50 the lower court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover if it were found that the publications were made with malice or with a reckless disregard of whether they
were true or false.5 1 Notwithstanding instructions on "actual malice," the
trial judge defined "malice" to include "spite, hostility or deliberate intention
to harm."' 52 The jury was allowed to find "malice" from the face of the publication. The verdict, structured on the combination of hostility and false44. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See the separate opinions
of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Brennan.
45. It is of further interest to note that of the majority in Curtis which judged the

magazine liable, the decisions of four Justices were based on the minority standard of
highly unreasonable conduct, while the opinion of the Chief Justice was founded on the
standard of actual malice. The standards applied will necessarily vary because the social
justifications change according to whether the plaintiff is a mayor, a movie star or a
laborer. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
46. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
47,. In Gertz v. Welch, - U.S. -, -, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3004, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 801
(1974), the Court outlined the three basic approaches as espoused in the five separate

opinions of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971):

(a) an extension

of the New York Times standard to an expanding variety of situations, (b) to vary the

level of constitutional privilege for defamatory falsehoods with the status of the person
defamed, and (c) absolute immunity from liability for the press and broadcasting media.
These diverse views reflect the rationale with which the Court is concerned when reviewing a libel suit. For example, newspapers should not be accorded the protection of New
York Times against private individuals because private citizens are simply more vulner-

able to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

injury having little or no access for rebuttal.
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (W. Va. 1975).
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970).
398 U.S. 6 (1970).
Id. at 9.
d. at 9.
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